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TuƌkeǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ has ďeeŶ iŶ a state of ĐhaŶge siŶĐe the AKP ;JustiĐe aŶd 
Development Party) government came into power in 2002. Regarding the internal 
and external factors, this article argues that the changes in identification national 
role have been one the factors that led Turkey to conduct a new pro-active 
foreign policy. Turkey has perceived duties and/or responsibilities for itself in its 
relations with other states in the regions to which Turkey feels deep-rooted 
historical, cultural and religious ties. The outcomes of this change have been 
observable in the relations between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) in the north of Iraq, which evolved from conflictual to cooperative relations 
since 2008.  
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Since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government came into power in 
2002, Turkish foreign policy has been in a state of change. These changes triggered 
the debate over whether objective material interests or ideas and perceptions are 
decisive on Turkish foreign policy. Since the AKP officials have always reiterated that 
the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy has been national interests, the 
changes in foreign policy behavior also require looking at the role of policymakers 
and their perception in decision-making process. In this respect, the emphasis of 
being a central country and a regional leader, which became an important part of 
national role, led Turkey to implement more cooperative foreign policy behavior. In 
accordance with this national role, Turkey has perceived duties and/or 
responsibilities for itself in its relations with other states in the regions to which 
Turkey feels deep-rooted historical, cultural and religious ties. The outcomes of this 
change have been observable in the relations between Turkey and the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) in the north of Iraq, which evolved from conflictual to 
cooperative relations since 2008. Turkey has declared in every occasion that it 
supports Iraq sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity. In addition, 
Turkey has also been engaged with the KRG of Iraq in order to seek ways for 
cooperation, which ranges from enhancing economic relations to collaborate against 
PKK that has main base in the Kandil Mountains in the north of Iraq.  
This aƌtiĐle aŶalǇzes the eǀolutioŶ of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelations with the KRG in order to 
understand the roots of how friendly relations have been constructed in a 
turbulent region. Regarding continuities and changes in the relations, both internal 
and external factors will be examined. It is observed that on the one hand, the 
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foreign policy principles of the AKP government, which has mainly constructed by 
Minister of Foreign Affaiƌs, Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu, iŶflueŶĐed TuƌkeǇ’s Ŷeǁ appƌoaĐh; 
on the other hand, the external factors occurred in the post-Saddam era paved the 
way for close relations between Turkey and the KRG. 
Changes in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade are partly the result of re-
definition of national role in the dynamic domestic and regional contexts. In the 
post-Iraqi War of 2003, regional reconstruction process led Turkey to re-define its 
role on the basis of being a leading country, so the establishment of cooperative 
relations in order to ensure regional security and stability became a priority in its 
foreign policy. The influence of national role in Turkish foreign policy behavior can 
easilǇ ďe seeŶ at the eǀolutioŶ of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG. While the 
bilateral relations were quite conflictual until 2008, since then both sides have 
been seeking for cooperation in both political and economic arenas.  
 
National Role Conception in Turkish Foreign Policy: Old Wine in a New Bottle? 
 
The national role approach to foreign policy analysis is a complementary method to 
understand foreign policy behavior of a state, which is not only influenced by the 
system, but also by identities, roles and norms. Since the analysis of a national role 
conception in foreign policy analysis is not within the scope of this article, it is sufficient 
to Ŷote heƌe that a ŶatioŶal ƌole ĐoŶĐeptioŶ highlǇ iŶflueŶĐes a ĐouŶtƌǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ 
behavior. Since policymakers construct national roles, taking into account national 
interests, goals, identities, geography, capability and socio-economic features, they 
also decide on a foreign policy behavior in accordance with national roles. According to 
Holsti, „A ŶatioŶal ƌole ĐoŶĐeptioŶ iŶĐludes the poliĐǇŵakeƌs͛ oǁŶ defiŶitioŶs of the 
general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and 
of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal sǇsteŵ oƌ iŶ the suďoƌdiŶate ƌegioŶal sǇsteŵs.”1 In other words, it is the 
image of policymakers of the appropriate foreign policy behavior of states towards or 
within the system. According to Holsti, a national role leads policymakers either to be 
active in the system through certain functions or commitments, or to be inactive.2 In 
this regard, the different perspectives in Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG, which 
are named as a „ƌealist-eǆĐlusiǀist appƌoaĐh” and a „liďeƌal-iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh,”3 
can be seen through the lens of a national role concept. 
By the late of 1990s, TuƌkeǇ’s ŶatioŶal ƌole suggested it to ďe ŵoƌe aĐtiǀe iŶ 
the ƌegioŶs that had tƌaditioŶallǇ ďeeŶ igŶoƌed ďǇ the elites. WheŶ İsŵail Ceŵ 
became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997, he reoriented Turkish foreign policy. 
Cem viewed the promises of former Foreign Ministers to maintain traditional 
                                                 
1 K. J. HOL“Tİ, National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, (September 1970), 245-246. 
2 Ibid, 254. 
3 Taƌık OĞU)LU, TuƌkeǇ͛s NoƌtheƌŶ IƌaƋ PoliĐǇ: CoŵpetiŶg PeƌspeĐtiǀes, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No 
3, (2008), 10. 
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Turkish foreign policy as guarantees that Turkey would take a hands-off approach 
to regional issues, distancing itself from its historical geography.4 Criticizing 
traditional Turkish foreign policy for being bereft of its historical dimension and 
trapped between „EuƌopeaŶ ǀeƌsus AsiaŶ” and „West ǀeƌsus East,” Cem 
introduced a foreign policy approach that included the concepts of depth, with 
respect to time, and breadth, with respect to space. 5 He also noted the role of 
Đultuƌe iŶ aŶǇ ĐouŶtƌǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ, saǇiŶg, „iŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of aŶǇ poliĐǇ – 
particularly in the shaping of foreign policy – a ŶatioŶ͛s Đultuƌe aŶd its self-
peƌĐeptioŶ aƌe fuŶdaŵeŶtal eleŵeŶts.”6 According to him, ruling elites had 
Ŷaƌƌoǁed TuƌkeǇ’s culture such that achievements inherited from previous 
historical periods were practically non-eǆisteŶt. TuƌkeǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ toǁaƌds 
Islamist states was thus negatively impacted by the cultural prejudices of the 
governing elites.7 Ceŵ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐy approach, in contrast, systematically 
ŵoďilized these histoƌiĐal aŶd Đultuƌal assets iŶ oƌdeƌ to iŵpƌoǀe TuƌkeǇ’s 
economic and political relations with countries in the Balkans and Middle East that 
shared a common Ottoman past.8  
As a continuation of Cem’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ appƌoaĐh, the ŵulti-dimensional and 
pro-active foreign policy, zero-problems with neighbors and the balance of 
security and democracy became the main principles of Turkish foreign policy 
under the AKP rule.9 Like İsŵail Ceŵ, Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu, ǁho ďeĐaŵe TuƌkeǇ’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, following a period as chief advisor to the Prime 
MiŶisteƌ, plaǇed a sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌole iŶ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg Tuƌkish foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ. Daǀutoğlu 
introduced the concept of strategic depth, which has two main components; the 
first is historical depth and the second is geographical depth. Daǀutoğlu aƌgues 
that historical depth, an assessment of the links between the past, present and 
future, and geographical depth, an outcome determined by relations between 
domestic, regional and global factors, should be taken into account in order to 
formulate a lasting strategic perspective.10 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to hiŵ, TuƌkeǇ’s positioŶ 
should be redefined in terms of its geographical position and historical assets. 
Turkey has generally been presented as a bridge between East and West or a 
ŵodel foƌ the Musliŵ ǁoƌld. Daǀutoğlu ƋuestioŶed this desigŶatioŶ. He adǀoĐates 
instead a view of Turkey as a central country in its own region,11 stating, 
It [Turkey] is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa 
                                                 
4 İsŵail CEM, TuƌkeǇ iŶ the Neǁ CeŶtuƌǇ Ϯnd Edition, Rustem Bookshop Mersin, 2001, 4. 
5 Ibid, 2-4. 
6 Ibid, 10. 
7 Ibid, 11. 
8 Ibid, 3. 
9 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, TüƌkiǇe Meƌkez Ülke Olŵalı, Radikal, Ϯϲ Şuďat ϮϬϬϰ. 
10 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, TuƌkeǇ͛s Foƌeign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, Insight Turkey 10, No 
ϭ, ϮϬϬϴ, ϴϬ. Foƌ ŵoƌe detailed iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ Daǀutoğlu’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ǀisioŶ, see: Ahŵet 
DAVUTOĞLU, “tƌatejik DERİNLİK, TüƌkiǇe͛ŶiŶ Uluslaƌaƌası KoŶuŵu, 23rd EditioŶ, Küƌe YaǇıŶlaƌı, İstaŶbul, 
2007.  
11 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, TüƌkiǇe Meƌkez Ülke Olŵalı, Radikal, Ϯϲ Şuďat ϮϬϬϰ. 
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through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal 
geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen 
neither as a bridge country, which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, 
nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or 
the West.12  
Moreover, the cultural geography of Turkey harmonizes elements from Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. Daǀutoğlu thus adǀoĐates a 
new diplomatic style for Turkey that does not reduce multiple identities into a 
unified character or a single region. In accordance with the multi-dimensional 
approach, Turkey actively involved itself in regional affairs in order to ensure a 
secure neighborhood. 
In this context, Turkey assumed itself a leading country role that „ǁoƌks to eǆpaŶd 
the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region; generate stability and security; help 
establish an order that paves the way for prosperity, human development and lasting 
staďilitǇ.”13 As a part of a multidimensional approach and active engagement with all 
ƌegioŶal sǇsteŵs iŶ TuƌkeǇ’s Ŷeighďoƌhood, „zeƌo-pƌoďleŵs ǁith Ŷeighďoƌs” became 
aŶotheƌ teŶet of the AKP’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ. To that eŶd, Daǀutoğlu aŶŶouŶĐed that 
TuƌkeǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ǀisioŶ had ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe ƌegioŶ-oriented in order to be able to 
deal with questions around Turkey in a systematic manner.14 In addition, he declared 
Turkey had a new role that dictated it to provide security and stability not only for 
itself, but also for its neighboring regions.15 According to AKP officials this was 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith TuƌkeǇ’s tƌaditioŶal foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ pƌeŵise: „peaĐe at hoŵe, peaĐe iŶ 
the ǁoƌld,” with new elements resulting from the end of the Cold War. These new 
elements did not contradict the fundamental values and interests of the Euro-Atlantic 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ. IŶ this ƌegaƌd, Daǀutoğlu thus asseƌted, „TuƌkeǇ should guaƌaŶtee its oǁŶ 
security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, 
staďilitǇ aŶd seĐuƌitǇ iŶ its eŶǀiƌoŶs.”16  
The iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ ǁithiŶ the 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk of afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed TuƌkeǇ’s self-perception and role. Ankara realized 
that the war in Iraq created changes in regional politics, which cannot be wished 
away ignoring Iraqi Kurds and the regional government in the north of Iraq. 
Therefore, as a part of its attempt to act as a balancer among different Iraqi groups 
and a facilitator between the US officials aŶd IƌaƋi “uŶŶi ƌesisteƌ, TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs 
with Iraqi Kurds have also been improving. In this respect, Turkey started to 
emphasize win-win approach in its relations with the KRG, rather than win-lose one. 
                                                 
12 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, TuƌkeǇ͛s FoƌeigŶ PoliĐǇ VisioŶ: AŶ AssessŵeŶt of ϮϬϬ7, Insight Turkey 10, No 
1, 2008, 78. 
13 Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa (Accessed 9 February 2013). 
14 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, Turkey in 2008, a discussion hosted by the Henry Jackson Society and Bob 
Laxton MP, 11 June 2008. 
15 Ahŵet DAVUTOĞLU, TuƌkeǇ͛s FoƌeigŶ PoliĐǇ VisioŶ: AŶ AssessŵeŶt of ϮϬϬ7, Insight Turkey 10, No 
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Moreover, it seems that Ankara desires to increase dependence of the KRG on 
Turkey as a strategy to reduce possible threats that would come from this region to 
Turkey.17 It should also be noted here that even though the motivations of KRG are 
different from Turkey, it also prefers to establish cooperative relations. Massoud 
Barzani, President of the KRG, mentioned mutual benefits of cooperation, indicating 
unity among European countries in the post-war years. 18 In this framework, 
following the decision of National Security Council in 2008 about the establishment 
of dialogue ǁith all eleŵeŶts of IƌaƋi politiĐs iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoŵote TuƌkeǇ’s eĐoŶoŵiĐ, 
eŶeƌgǇ aŶd stƌategiĐ iŶteƌests iŶ IƌaƋ, TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG has ďeeŶ 
deǀelopiŶg. IŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, Muƌat Özçelik, ǁho ǁas TuƌkeǇ’s “peĐial EŶǀoǇ for Iraq, 
aŶd Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu, ǁho ǁas Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ’s Chief FoƌeigŶ PoliĐǇ Adǀisoƌ, ŵet 
with Barzani in Baghdad. This meeting was seen as a first signal of a new era in the 
relations between Turkey and the KRG because this was the first high-level contact 
between Turkish officials and the KRG officials.  
The re-election of AKP in 2007 consolidated its power that led it to act boldly 
not only in internal politics, but also in international politics. Contrary to traditional 
policies, the AKP government has attempted to separate the terror problem 
caused by the PKK from the cultural, social and economic demands of its Kurdish 
citizens, aiming to resolve the Kurdish issue. In the summer of 2009, the AKP 
government launched an initiative first called the „Kuƌdish opeŶiŶg,” then 
renamed a „deŵoĐƌatiĐ opeŶiŶg” so as to apply to other groups, including non-
Muslims, Alevis and Romans. According to the AKP government, the aim of these 
initiatives was to strengthen social unity in Turkey through democratization.19 For 
this puƌpose, TuƌkeǇ’s fiƌst offiĐial Kuƌdish-language television channel was 
established, and the government called for the establishment of Kurdish literature 
departments at state universities. These initiatives also facilitated the acceptability 
of a „liďeral-iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh” towards the KRG. 
The implementation of this policy, labeled as aiming to balance security and 
democracy, has also had ƌepeƌĐussioŶs iŶ TuƌkeǇ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ, espeĐiallǇ 
towards the north of Iraq. Like balancing security and democracy in internal 
politics, Turkey started to make an effort to balance security and economy in 
international politics. In accordance with the latter, Turkey once again became 
throttle of Kurdish entity by improving its economic ties and providing its 
geographical support to the Kurdish entity to integrate with the world, as 
mentioned by Nevzat Hadi, governor of Arbil. 20 The opening of a Turkish consulate 
in Arbil contributed positively to this rapprochement process.  
                                                 
17 Fikƌet BİLA, KuzeǇ Iƌak͛taki Çelişki, MilliǇet, Ϯϴ Şuďat  ϮϬϬϳ. 
18 Inteƌǀieǁ ǁith Massoud BaƌzaŶi ďǇ Mete ÇUBUKÇU, BaƌzaŶi: Baƌışı Saďote EtŵeǇe ÇalışıǇoƌlaƌ, 
NTVMSNBC, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25030008 9 December 2009 (Accessed 1 February 2013). 
19 The Democratic Opening Project with Questions and Answers: The National Brotherhood Project, 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/acilim220110.pdf  (Accessed 3 May 2012) 
20 Erbil Valisi Nevzat Hadi, KüƌtleƌiŶ İlişkileƌiŶde Eğiliŵ TüƌkiǇe͛Ǉe Doğƌuduƌ, Oƌtadoğu “tƌatejik 
Aƌaştıƌŵalaƌ Meƌkezi ;OR“AMͿ, ϭϯ MaǇ ϮϬϭϬ http://ǁǁǁ.oƌsaŵ.oƌg.tƌ/tƌ/ oƌsaŵkoŶukgosteƌ.aspǆ? 
ID=157 (Accessed 5 January 2013). 
 
 




Transformation of Turkish Foreign PoliĐǇ: Froŵ a „Realist-EǆĐlusioŶist” to a 
„Liďeral-IŶtegratioŶist” ApproaĐh 
 
Historically, the presence of PKK in the north of Iraq, the political demands of 
IƌaƋi Kuƌds aŶd the issues ƌelated ǁith the seĐuƌitǇ of TuƌkŵeŶ’s ƌights iŶ the Ŷoƌth 
of Iraq, had created serious tension between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish 
authoƌitǇ. IŶ this fƌaŵeǁoƌk, TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the Kuƌdish authoƌities had 
always been security-oriented and continued with ups and downs. By the Iraq War 
in 2003, however, mainly two diffeƌeŶt ǀieǁs appeaƌed ƌegaƌdiŶg TuƌkeǇ’s 
approach towards the north of Iraq. On the one hand, the „ƌealist-exclusivist 
appƌoaĐh” maintains security-oriented views.21 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to this ǀieǁ, TuƌkeǇ’s 
fight against the PKK terrorism would not reach to a successful end unless the KRG 
stops to turn a blind eye to the presence of PKK in the north of Iraq. In addition, 
this view advocates that the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in the 
north of Iraq, which is a real threat to Turkey, should not be ignored, especially 
after the political gains of Iraqi Kurds by the Constitution. Lastly, it sees liberal 
approach as a double-edged sword, which would also re-awaken Kurdish 
nationalism as a result of gaining economic power. Therefore, Turkey should be 
careful while conducting a liberal approach towards the north of Iraq. In other 
words, it argues that while Turkey is planning to preserve territorial integrity of 
Iraq through establishing mutual economic interdependence with the KRG, Turkey 
can also serve to the KRG to gain economic development, which could create 
opportunities to declare independency. On the other hand, the „liďeƌal-
iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh” supports the engagement with the north of Iraq.22 
According to this view, Turkey does not need to fear Iraqi Kurds, if it conducts 
liberal-democratic policies. By this way, Turkey can increase the loyalty of its own 
Kurdish citizens to the state improving their well-being; can consolidate the need 
of the KRG to Turkey rising mutual interdependence and can help to preserve the 
integrity of Iraq. 
In the aftermath of the Iraq War, the „ƌealist-eǆĐlusioŶist appƌoaĐh” 
maintained its influence in Turkish foreign policy towards the north of Iraq due to 
the political gains of the KRG which officially became a federated region by the 
Iraqi Constitution, the increasing terrorist attacks of the PKK and the resistance of 
the US to Turkish military operations in the north of Iraq. 
As seen, the external factors played an important role for Turkey to conduct a 
„realist-exclusioŶist appƌoaĐh” towards the north of Iraq. In this framework, 
TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith IƌaƋi Kuƌds ĐaŶŶot ďe studied iŶ isolatioŶ fƌoŵ Tuƌkish-
American relations and the consequences of Iraq War in 2003. Although Turkey 
and the US have been allied in various fields, the Iraq War highlighted their 
                                                 
21 Taƌık OĞU)LU, TuƌkeǇ͛s NoƌtheƌŶ IƌaƋ PoliĐǇ: CoŵpetiŶg PeƌspeĐtiǀes, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No 
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contradictory interests. In the preliminary stages of the war, leaders of Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) and the US 
senior officials held discussions from which Turkey was excluded. Then, on 1 
March 2003, the Turkish parliament voted not to grant permission to US troops to 
use its air bases and launch its ground offensive from its soil, and in so doing, 
forfeited its opportunity to take part in the reconstruction of Iraq. On 4 July 2003, 
US forces arrested Turkish special operation troops in Suleymaniyah on charges of 
conspiring to assassinate the governor of Kirkuk.23 This episode was interpreted as 
a clear sign that the United States favored Iraqi Kurds over its strategic partner, 
Turkey.24 
Unlike Turkey, Iraqi Kurds welcomed the US invasion of Iraq and cooperated 
with its officials. These close relations entitled the Kurds to participate in Iraqi 
politics on equal footing with Iraqi Arabs for the first time. Kurdish demands for 
substantial autonomy in and beyond the mainly Kurdish region in the north of Iraq 
before drafting a constitution alarmed Turkey. The constitution recognized the 
Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah as a legal region25 with the 
power to amend laws not under federal purview, to maintain internal security 
forces and to establish representatives abroad26 It also approved Kurdish as an 
official language, alongside Arabic.27 This development reinforced Turkish concerns 
over US-backed Kurdish autonomy in the north of Iraq.  
From the Turkish perspective, the disintegration of Iraq would most likely 
result in the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq 
and this would trigger separatist demands among its own Kurdish citizens,28 
backed by some regional and extra-regional countries that would benefit from 
such a development. This perception had been one of the main reasons of 
TuƌkeǇ’s teŶse ƌelatioŶs ǁith IƌaƋi Kuƌdish authoƌities. The politiĐal ǀaĐuuŵ iŶ the 
north of Iraq after the collapse of the Saddam regime created opportunities for 
Iraqi Kurds to expand their political and economic power. In this context, Massoud 
BaƌzaŶi deepeŶed TuƌkeǇ’s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs, statiŶg, „WheŶ the ƌight tiŵe Đoŵes, aŶ 
independent Kurdish state will ďe a ƌealitǇ.”29 As a result, the expansion of power 
of Iraqi Kurds and the deterioration of Turkish-American relations became a basis 
for the proponents of „ƌealist-eǆĐlusioŶist appƌoaĐh.” 
In the meantime, the increasing terrorist attacks of PKK also caused to tense 
relations with the US, Iraq and also the KRG. The increasing attacks reinforced the 
perception in Turkey that the mountains of the north of Iraq remained a safe 
haven for the PKK due to the policies of the United States in the post-Saddam era. 
                                                 
23 Derya SAZAK, KuzeǇ Iƌak BaskıŶı, Milliyet, 6 Temmuz 2003. 
24 Taha AKYOL, ABD KiŵiŶ Müttefiki?, MilliǇet, ϴ Teŵŵuz ϮϬϬϯ; HüsŶü MAHALLI, ÇiƌkiŶ Aŵeƌikalı, 
YeŶi Şafak, ϲ HaziƌaŶ ϮϬϬϯ. 
25 Iraqi Constitution, Article 117. 
26 Iraqi Constitution, Article 121. 
27 Iraqi Constitution, Article 4. 
28 Fikret BILA, BaƌzaŶi͛ŶiŶ Hedefi Bağdat Değil, GüŶeǇdoğu, MilliǇet, ϭϯ Aƌalık 2005. 
29 Barzani: Kurdish State Inevitable, HüƌƌiǇet DailǇ Neǁs, ϰ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϬϱ. 
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Turkey noticed that its alliance with the United States did not put an end to the 
PKK presence in the north of Iraq.30 In autumn 2003, Washington agreed to take 
measures against the PKK presence in the north of Iraq on behalf of Ankara, but 
Turkey saw no evidence. At the beginning of 2004, Deputy Head of the Turkish 
Aƌŵed FoƌĐes GeŶeƌal İlkeƌ Başďuğ stated that „the US͛s fight agaiŶst the PKK is 
Ŷot ŵeetiŶg ouƌ [TuƌkeǇ͛s] eǆpeĐtatioŶ.”31 A year later, the general reminded the 
US that Turkey was waiting for concrete steps to be taken, stating „oŶ this suďjeĐt, 
ǁe aƌe Ŷot at the saŵe poiŶt as the UŶited States. The PKK͛s politiĐal aŶd 
ideological supports must be cut, their leaders and members must be arrested, 
their financial and logistic supports must be cut, and their command control system 
ŵust ďe Đut.”32 In the meantime, the increasing terrorist activities of the PKK, 
Đoupled ǁith U“ oppositioŶ to TuƌkeǇ’s ŵilitaƌǇ opeƌatioŶs iŶ IƌaƋi teƌƌitoƌǇ, 
obligated Turkey to search for ways to cooperate with the United States and Iraqi 
governments. The result was a tripartite mechanism, and in 2006, Ankara 
appoiŶted ƌetiƌed geŶeƌal Edip Başeƌ, ǁhile WashiŶgtoŶ appoiŶted ƌetiƌed geŶeƌal 
Joseph Ralston as special envoys in meetings about the PKK. However, Turkey was 
disappointed by the apparent hesitation of the US occupational forces to take 
action against the PKK. When Washington, Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds offered an 
envoy from the autonomous Kurdish authority to the process, the talks became 
deadlocked. Turkey announced that it would not accept the envoy as long as the 
Kuƌdish authoƌitǇ ĐoŶtiŶued to ďaĐk the PKK. As a ƌesult, Edip Başeƌ ƌesigŶed iŶ 
February 2007.  
As with the US government, the Iraqi government did nothing to counter the 
presence of the PKK in the north of IƌaƋ. FoƌeigŶ MiŶisteƌ Aďdullah Gül ŵeŶtioŶed, 
„The saddeŶiŶg poiŶt heƌe is that ǁhile TuƌkeǇ has doŶe eǀeƌǇthiŶg it Đould to 
ensure security, prosperity, and stability in Iraq, Iraqi authorities have not shown 
any effort to prevent PKK activities from takiŶg plaĐe oŶ theiƌ oǁŶ soil.”33 
Therefore, all these factors caused to the maintenance of the „ƌealist-exclusivist 
appƌoaĐh” in Turkish foreign policy towards the north of Iraq.  
The turning point in both Turkish-American and Turkish-KRG relations 
happened in the aftermath of 2007. Regarding Turkish-American relations, the 
ǀisit of Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ ReĐep TaǇǇip EƌdoğaŶ to WashiŶgtoŶ iŶ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϮϬϬϳ 
opened a new phase. After this meeting, US supported Turkish struggle against 
PKK, opening up the north of IƌaƋ’s aiƌspaĐe foƌ TuƌkeǇ’s opeƌatioŶs aŶd pƌoǀidiŶg 
real-time intelligence against the PKK targets. In addition, a shift in Turkish foreign 
                                                 
30 Rasiŵ Özgüƌ DÖNME) aŶd PıŶaƌ ENNELI, The Changing Logic of Political Violence: The Case of the 
PKK in Turkey after the Invasion of Iraq – VioleŶĐe foƌ VioleŶĐe͛s Sake, in Marika GUGGISBERG and David 
WEIR (eds.) Understanding Violence: Contexts and Portrayals, Inter-disciplinary Press, Oxford, United 
Kingdom, 2009, 125. 
31 GeŶelkuƌŵaǇ͛daŶ Açıklaŵa: İŶĐiƌlik͛iŶ KullaŶıŵı UǇguŶ BuluǇoƌuz, Milliyet, 16 Ocak 2004. 
32 ͞GeŶeƌal BAŞBUĞ: We are Waiting for Concrete Steps from the US on the PKK Matter, HüƌƌiǇet 
Daily News, 7 June 2005. 
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policy behavior towards the KRG became apparent. On the one hand, Turkey 
continued to launch air operations on the PKK camps in the north of Iraq. On the 
other hand, Turkey attempted to act as a central country attentively following and 
actively involving in regional affairs, especially in the north of Iraq. Put another 
way, both the internal and external factors created the changes in the relations 
between Turkey and the KRG. Internally, the political strength of AKP after the 
2007 election led it to conduct boldly its foreign policy principles, which mainly 
support the use of soft power and engagement with states and non-state actors in 
seeking solutions for security issues. Externally, the changes created by the Iraq 
War led Turkey to establish stable and good relations with the KRG. As a result, the 
proponents of the „liďeƌal-iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh” have gained the upper hand in 
the deďate of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG siŶĐe ϮϬϬϴ. Theƌefoƌe, the folloǁiŶg 
part will focus on both political and economic relations in which the changes of the 
dominant approach in Turkish foreign policy from a „ƌealist-exclusionist appƌoaĐh” 
to a „liďeƌal-iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh” can easily be observed. In accordance with 
the latteƌ, TuƌkeǇ’s poliĐies toǁaƌds the KRG haǀe ďeeŶ softeŶiŶg that led ďoth 
sides to conduct high-level official contact, searching ways for political cooperation 
and developing economic ties.   
The first signals of improving relations between Turkey and the KRG were seen 
in the changes of the discourses of officials and their mutual perceptions. Just as 
Ankara views Iraqi Turkmens as the relatives of Turkish people, the same approach 
started to be applied to the Iraqi Kurds, treating them as members of the family. 
The stateŵeŶt of PƌesideŶt Aďdullah Gül, ǁho ŵeŶtioŶed ďoth IƌaƋi Kuƌds aŶd 
Turkmens are beloved relatives of Turkey, demonstrated the changes in Turkey’s 
treatment.34 In the following years, Turkey deepened its political and economic 
ties ǁith the Ŷoƌth of IƌaƋ. The ǀisit of Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu, MiŶisteƌ of FoƌeigŶ 
Affaiƌs aŶd )afeƌ ÇağlaǇaŶ, MiŶisteƌ of IŶdustƌǇ aŶd CoŵŵeƌĐe, to Aƌďil ǁas also 
perceived as a sign of the coming „spƌiŶg” in the relations between Turkey and the 
KRG.35 In that regard, Rebwar Karim Vali, editor-in-chief of a Kurdish journal, 
Hewler Post, mentioned the rapprochement process in the relations with Turkey 
and the Iraqi Kurds by which it is supposed to consolidate Turkish and Kurdish 
collective strategic perspective in the region.36 In this context, the perception of 
Iraqi Kurdish authority has changed as well. While they had perceived Turkey as a 
strong block in front of their federated state, now they see Turkey as a „task foƌĐe 
for the socio-eĐoŶoŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶt of IƌaƋi Kuƌdish ƌegioŶ.”37 In this framework, 
the easing tension over the Kirkuk issue will be analyzed later in detail because it is 
a good case to see the influence of external factors that worked for the changes in 
ŵutual peƌĐeptioŶs aŶd TuƌkeǇ’s appƌoaĐh toǁaƌds the KRG.  
                                                 
34 GÜL: TüƌkŵeŶleƌ de Küƌtleƌ de Akƌaďaŵız, Sabah,14 Ocak 2007. 
35 Mete ÇUBUKÇU, KuzeǇ Iƌak Şiŵdi BaƌzaŶi͛Ǉe AŶkaƌa Daǀeti BekliǇoƌ, RefeƌaŶs, ϯ Kasıŵ ϮϬϬϵ. 
36 Mete ÇUBUKÇU, BaƌzaŶi͛ŶiŶ )iǇaƌeti Iƌaklı Küƌtleƌle YeŶi Biƌ SaǇfa AçaĐak, RefeƌaŶs, ϲ MaǇıs ϮϬϭϬ. 
37 “eleŶ ToŶkuş Kaƌeeŵ, Interview with Haydar Mustafa Said, Iraqi Kurdistan Regional 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt’s OffiĐial, Oƌtadoğu AŶaliz, Cilt ϰ, Maƌt ϮϬϭϮ, Ϯϯ-24. 
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It is also certain that Turkey has successfully involved in the north of Iraq in 
economic terms, which will also be discussed later in detail. Another significant sign of 
ďoth sides’ effoƌts to iŵpƌoǀe ƌelatioŶs is seeŶ iŶ the ďaŶkiŶg aŶd tƌaŶspoƌtatioŶ 
projects. As mentioned by Siyawesh Ayyo, Minister of Transport of the KRG, Turkey 
and the KRG are working on to connect Arbil, Suleymaniya and Dohuk to Turkey via rail 
line.38 Although these projects need time to be accomplished, they demonstrate the 
willingness of both sides to improve and deepen their relations. In addition, Turkish 
bank ďƌaŶĐhes, ŶaŵelǇ TüƌkiǇe İş BaŶkası, VakıfďaŶk, )iƌaat BaŶkası aŶd Alďaƌaka-Tüƌk, 
have already been opened in Arbil.  
 
Easing Tension over the Kirkuk Issue 
 
Turkey has always expressed its sensitivity towards Kirkuk. Like neighboring 
other countries, the primary concern of Turkey is the nationalist ambitions of Iraqi 
Kurds. Since Kirkuk is claimed by Iraqi Kurdish leaders as the „Kuƌdish Jeƌusaleŵ” 
and perceived as the political and economic hub of any future independent 
Kuƌdish state, OsŵaŶ Koƌutüƌk, ǁho ǁas TuƌkeǇ’s speĐial eŶǀoǇ foƌ IƌaƋ, stated 
that „Kiƌkuk is Ŷot oŶlǇ aŶ iŶteƌŶal ďusiŶess foƌ IƌaƋ; it ĐoŶĐeƌŶs its Ŷeighďoƌs as 
ǁell.”39 Therefore, the preservation of Turkmen identity of the city has been seen 
important for Turkey to secure territorial integrity of Iraq.   
In February 2003, Ankara and Washington reached an agreement on Kirkuk 
that suggested not letting any armed force in Kirkuk other than the US troops. 
However, just after the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, peshmergas of KDP and 
PUK entered in Kirkuk along with the US troops and started to damage historical, 
cultural and demographic feature of the city. Then, Turkish authorities expressed 
theiƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aŶd Aďdullah Gül, ǁho ǁas MiŶisteƌ of FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs, Đalled U“ 
Secretary of State ColliŶ Poǁel to pƌeseƌǀe TuƌkeǇ’s iŶteƌests as ǁas pƌoŵised. 
Contrary to Turkish demand, the United States and KDP and PUK signed a 
memorandum on 17 May 2003 that provided the presence of peshmergas in 
Kirkuk in the name of helping the US forces in fight against terrorists. In this way, 
Kurds took control of Kirkuk and Kurdified the city through settling the Kurdish 
population from other regions, even from neighboring countries. As a result of the 
migrations, the Kurdish population in Kirkuk increased disproportionately. In 
addition, Kurdish control of Kirkuk spread to political areas as getting power in 23 
of 24 Directorates of Service in the Kirkuk provincial council.  
In the insecure environment throughout the country, the Iraqi Constitution was 
approved by a controversial referendum on 15 October 2005. Article 140 of 
Constitution suggested a road map for Kirkuk that foresees to have a referendum 
until 31 December 2007, after the necessary measures, normalization and 
census40, have been completed. However, the lack of political consensus and the 
                                                 
38 TüƌkiǇe ile KuzeǇ Iƌak AƌasıŶda TƌeŶ Hattı AçılıǇor, Zaman, 12 Ocak 2013. 
39 Kirkuk Sensitivity, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 15 October 2004. 
40 With the „ŶoƌŵalizatioŶ” process, the return of those who were forced to migrate from Kirkuk 
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incomplete normalization process and census made the road map to be null and 
void. While Iraqi Kurds were advocating that Kirkuk has been a Kurdish city and 
should be under the Kurdish administration, Turkmens and Arabs have opposed 
this claim and suggested Kirkuk to have a special status within a united Iraq. In the 
meantime, the Kirkuk issue also got an international dimension with the 
intervention of the United Nations (UN) which offered a solution that provides 
shared governance among Turkmens, Kurds and Arabs at 32% and Christians at 4% 
rate. Iraqi Parliament also decided on a similar decision. However, this solution as 
well could not be implemented in reality. When local elections were held on 31 
January 2009, Kirkuk was excluded and nothing changed in the administration. 
Therefore, Turkmens and Arabs protested the provincial council and abdicated. 
Between 2005 and 2011, several commissions were formed to solve the disputes 
on assets and demographics, but did not achieve.  
IŶ the afteƌŵath of ϮϬϬϳ, TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG ƌeŵaƌkaďlǇ eǀolǀed 
from conflictual to cooperative, which can easily be observed in the Kirkuk issue.41 
Between 2003 and 2008, the Kirkuk issue was the main conflictual topic between 
Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish authorities due to their opposing views over the 
status and identity of Kirkuk. While Turkey has perceived the preservation of the 
special status of Kirkuk that is composed by Turkmens, Kurds, Arabs and Christians 
as a guarantee to secure territorial integrity of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish authorities 
attempted to control Kirkuk to expand their political and economic power. 
Therefore, the „ƌealist-eǆĐlusiǀist appƌoaĐh”, in which Turkey had underlined its 
„ƌed-liŶes” at every occasion, was dominant in Turkish foreign policy between 
2003 and 2008, regarding the Kirkuk issue.  
It seems that the main force behind the easing tension since 2008 is not the 
changes in the ultimate purpose of both sides. In other words, there is not a sign 
that the perception of the KRG and Turkey has changed. The visit of Ahmet 
Daǀutoğlu, MiŶisteƌ of FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs, to Kiƌkuk oŶ Ϯ August ϮϬϭϮ has 
deŵoŶstƌated TuƌkeǇ’s oŶgoiŶg seŶsitiǀitǇ aďout Kiƌkuk.42 In the press conference, 
Daǀutoğlu ŵeŶtioŶed,  
Kirkuk will always haǀe a speĐial aŶd pƌiǀileged plaĐe iŶ ouƌ heaƌt. ;…Ϳ It 
[Kirkuk] is a city where Turkmen, Arab, Kurdish and Assyrian components have 
liǀed iŶ peaĐe foƌ ĐeŶtuƌies. ;…Ϳ The pƌiŵaƌǇ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of this peaĐeful ĐitǇ is the 
Turkmen component that will never disappear. Today, we took another decision 
                                                                                                                  
during the Saddam regime and the compensation of injustices were meant.  
41 The Baath Party had created the Kirkuk issue. Within the scope of Arabization policy of the 
Baath Party, Turkmen and Kurdish population were evacuated from Kirkuk and forced to migrate 
to southern cities of Iraq between the years of 1975 and 2001. In return, the Arab population was 
settled in Kirkuk. In the post-Saddam era, however, the Arabization policy of the Baath Party was 
replaced by the Kurdification policy of the KRG. Since then, the Kirkuk issue has contained not 
only the dispute over identity, but also the competition over sovereignty in political and 
economic terms.  
42 The ǀisit of Daǀutoğlu ǁas the fiƌst ǀisit ŵade ďǇ Tuƌkish offiĐials siŶĐe the ǀisit of İhsaŶ “aďƌi 
ÇağlaǇaŶgil, ǁho ǁas MiŶisteƌ of FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs, iŶ ϭϵϳϲ. 
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that ŵade ŵe so happǇ. We said KoŶǇa aŶd Kiƌkuk ďeĐoŵe sisteƌ Đities. ;…Ϳ.43 
As seeŶ fƌoŵ the stateŵeŶt of Daǀutoğlu, TuƌkeǇ’s seŶsitiǀitǇ oŶ Kiƌkuk aŶd the 
security of Turkmens still exist. However, Turkey and the KRG managed to reduce 
the level of tension. It seems that both sides have realized common interests of 
Kirkuk to have a special status, being a single-governorate region. In this 
framework, the external factors contributed to that realization. Firstly, the planned 
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 contributed to the 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG. Secondly, the expansion of Iran in 
the post-Saddam era necessitated Turkey to increase its soft power in the north of 
Iraq as a part of balancing Iranian influence through the region. Lastly, the 
economic concerns of Turkey led it to establish stable relations with the KRG in 
oƌdeƌ to aĐĐess to Kiƌkuk oil, ǁhiĐh ǁould seƌǀe to TuƌkeǇ’s eŶeƌgǇ stƌategǇ.44  
 
„TradiŶg State”: A New Role? 
 
In accordance with the policy of zero-problems with neighbors, improving 
relations with regional states became an iŵpoƌtaŶt aspeĐt of the AKP’s foƌeigŶ 
policy in order to ensure regional stability and security through consolidating 
economic interdependence. Therefore, AKP adopted the policy of zero-problems-
limitless trade with neighbors.  
Economy had become an important parameter in Turkish foreign policy during 
the Özal peƌiod of the ϭϵϴϬs, as a ƌesult of the iŶĐƌeasiŶg iŶflueŶĐe of ďusiŶess 
circles in foreign policy decision-making. This trend did not last due to heightened 
security concerns mainly from the north of Iraq in the 1990s, but was reintroduced 
by the AKP government as part of a strategy to negate regional conflicts. In this 
framework, it is observed that business-state interaction has increased and the 
business circles have supported and never challenged the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt’s poliĐies. 
IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, theǇ haǀe ďaĐked TuƌkeǇ’s atteŵpt to eŶsuƌe oƌdeƌ iŶ the Middle 
East through economic interdependence. They also supported the policy of zero-
problems-limitless trade with neighbors, aiming to reach new markets. As Mustafa 
Kutlay mentioned, „the Tuƌkish ďusiŶess elite haǀe ďeguŶ to eǆploƌe eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd 
financial opportunities in neighboring countries, and have backed the state in its 
efforts to stabilize the region for the sake of their interests, inter alia.͟45  
The re-introduction of economy as an important parameter of Turkish foreign 
poliĐǇ also suppoƌted TuƌkeǇ’s ƌole, ǁhiĐh ǁas Ŷotified ďǇ Daǀutoğlu, „to eǆpaŶd 
the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region, and to generate stability and 
                                                 
43 Daǀutoğlu ITC͛de KoŶuşŵa Yaptı, HüƌƌiǇet, Ϯ Ağustos ϮϬϭϮ, foƌ full teǆt: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/21131639.asp (Accessed 17 February 2013). 
44 TuƌkeǇ’s eŶeƌgǇ stƌategǇ ƌests oŶ thƌee pillaƌs. The fiƌst is to guaƌaŶtee diǀeƌsified, ƌeliaďle aŶd 
cost-effective supplies for domestic needs. The second is to liberalize its energy market and the third is 
to become a transit country and energy hub. 
45 Mustafa KUTLAY, EĐoŶoŵǇ as the PƌaĐtiĐal HaŶd of ͚Neǁ Tuƌkish FoƌeigŶ PoliĐǇ͛: A PolitiĐal 
Economy Explanation, Insight Turkey 13, No 1, 2011, 71. 
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seĐuƌitǇ”.46 Regarding the liŶk ďetǁeeŶ the AKP aŶd ďusiŶess ĐiƌĐles, Kiƌişçi aƌgues 
that „Tuƌkish foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ďehaǀioƌ iŶ the last Đouple of Ǉeaƌs has iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ 
been shaped by economic considerations – such as export markets, investment 
opportunities, tourism, energy supplies aŶd the like.”47 IŶ this ƌegaƌd, Kiƌişçi laďels 
Turkey a „tƌadiŶg state,” usiŶg RoseĐƌaŶĐe’s teƌŵ. RoseĐƌaŶĐe aƌgued that the 
world was transforming from a „ŵilitaƌǇ politiĐal aŶd teƌƌitoƌial sǇsteŵ” into a 
„tƌadiŶg ǁoƌld” characterized by economic interdependence.48 In his view, this 
system favors countries that cooperate rather than emphasize military capabilities 
and struggle for power. It thus becomes preferable to resolve disputes with 
neighbors in order to promote trade and investment.49 Based on this argument, it 
ǁould Ŷot ďe false to aƌgue that TuƌkeǇ’s pƌoŵotioŶ of tƌade ǁith the KRG, ƌatheƌ 
than political disputes, is partly a result of its new role in accordance with being a 
trading state.  
Turkey and the KRG have taken concrete steps to deepen economic and energy 
ties. Mustafa “eǀeƌ, ǁho is DeputǇ MiŶisteƌ of EĐoŶoŵǇ, aŶŶouŶĐed that TuƌkeǇ’s 
export to Iraq reached to $10.7 billion in 201250 aŶd Mehŵet Cöŵeƌt, ǁho is 
Director General of Product Safety and Inspection at the Ministry of Economy, 
deĐlaƌed that ϴϱ% of TuƌkeǇ’s eǆpoƌt has goŶe to the Ŷoƌth of IƌaƋ.51 In addition, 
TuƌkeǇ’s iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ the Ŷoƌth of IƌaƋ is Ƌuite sigŶifiĐaŶt. IŶ ϮϬϭϮ, ϭϰ% of total 
investment in the north of Iraq was made by foreign direct investment and Turkey 
is at the top of the list with its 4% share.52 As the time of early 2013, 2.241 foreign 
firms from 78 countries have been registered in the north of Iraq and 48% of those 
firms are Turkish. 53 As stated ďǇ “iŶaŶ Çeleďi, MiŶisteƌ of Tƌade aŶd IŶdustƌǇ of 
the KRG, Turkish firms successfully built almost all big building businesses, 
including hotels, airports, factories and highways in the north of Iraq. Moreover, 
Çeleďi eŵphasized that IƌaƋi Kuƌds ŵostlǇ pƌefeƌ to ĐoŶsuŵe Tuƌkish goods iŶ 
their houses.54 Neǀaf Kılıç, ǁho is diƌeĐtoƌ of TuƌkeǇ-IƌaƋ IŶdustƌialists’ aŶd 
BusiŶessŵeŶ’s AssoĐiatioŶ, also ŵeŶtioŶed that ϵϱ% of goods iŶ the shops iŶ Aƌďil 
are full by Turkish goods.55 
Besides the eŶhaŶĐeŵeŶt of TuƌkeǇ’s eǆpoƌt to aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ the Ŷoƌth of 
                                                 
46 Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy,͟ RepuďliĐ of TuƌkeǇ MiŶistƌǇ of FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa (Accessed 9 February 2013). 
47 Keŵal KİRİŞÇİ, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New 
Perspectives on Turkey No 49, 2009, 39. 
48 Richard ROSECRANCE, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern 
World, Basic Books, New York, 1986, 40. 
49 Richard ROSECRANCE, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming State, Basic 
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Iraq, cooperation in energy field has also been improving. According to the 
declaration of GAZPROM, Turkey pays $406, $300 and $500 respectively to Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Iran for every thousand m3 of natural gas that it imports. Taking 
into account that nearly 48 billion m3 of natural gas was consumed in 2012, 
TuƌkeǇ’s effoƌts to diǀeƌsifǇ Ŷatuƌal-gas supporters became understandable.56 In 
this framework, improving energy ties with Iraqi government, especially with the 
KRG, ďeĐaŵe sigŶifiĐaŶt foƌ TuƌkeǇ’s iŶĐƌeasing energy demands. As expected, it 
creates serious problems at the Ankara-Arbil- Baghdad line. Even though Baghdad 
has refused to recognize the exploration agreements that have been signed 
between the KRG and oil companies, the regional government backed these 
agreements. The main reason of the conflict lies on the struggle for the 
sovereignty over territory and energy sources. Another serious dispute between 
Arbil and Baghdad, and between Baghdad and Ankara, was caused by the 
agreement reached by the KRG and Turkey that suggests the KRG to send crude oil 
for refinement in Turkey. Despite the discontent of Iraqi government, the KRG 
started to export some amount of crude oil to Turkey. Turkish Energy Minister 
TaŶeƌ Yıldız deĐlaƌed, „Cƌude puƌĐhases fƌoŵ the north of Iraq have begun with a 
volume of 5-10 road tankers. This may rise to 100-ϮϬϬ taŶkeƌs a daǇ.”57 In addition, 
KRG’s MiŶisteƌ of Oil, Ashti Haǁƌaŵi, ŵeŶtioŶed the ǁilliŶgŶess to iŵpƌoǀe eŶeƌgǇ 
ties with Turkey. Hawrami stated that the KRG has been selling oil to Turkey in 
order to meet its needs and working on to construct a pipeline.58 He also 
mentioned that after reaching an agreement with Baghdad, the KRG aims to reach 
to eǆpoƌt ϭ ŵillioŶ ďaƌƌel of Đƌude oil peƌ daǇ aŶd to ŵeet TuƌkeǇ’s ϭϱ ďillioŶ-m3 
natural gas need.59 In fact, the improving economic ties between Turkey and the 
KRG became the main base of the „liďeƌal-iŶtegƌatioŶist appƌoaĐh”, which is seen 
as an appropriate way to ensure regional security and stability.  
 
Conclusion: Are Good Relations between Turkey and the KRG Sustainable? 
 
As seeŶ, TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG haǀe ǁaƌŵed siŶĐe ϮϬϬϴ, iŵpƌoǀiŶg 
political and economic relations. However, there is still an important question to 
be answered: Would a national role concept in explaining foreign policy behavior 
be sufficient to predict for the prediction of future foreign policy behavior? and 
Would the current good relations between Turkey and the KRG be sustainable? 
Since individuals construct the national role, it may differ for each individual in 
accordance with their personalities, beliefs, interpretations and external stimulus. 
Therefore, the answer of the first question is negative. Moreover, the 
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57 Turkey Importing Crude From The north of Iraq in Road Tankers, Ahramonline, 13 July 2012. 
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rapprochement process between Turkey and the KRG has still been fragile despite 
the rapid improvement of bilateral relations. First and maybe the most important 
issue is the uncertainty of the future of PKK. If the „peaĐe pƌoĐess” between 
Turkey and PKK, which aimed at providing a peaceful solution to terrorism, will fail, 
TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelations with the KRG will inevitably be influenced in a negative term, as 
long as PKK finds sanctuary in the north of Iraq.60   
Secondly, Turkey-KRG rapprochement does not occur in isolation from the 
dynamics of domestic politics both in Turkey and in Iraq. In Turkey, the warming 
relation with the KRG is still perceived by some politicians and bureaucrats as a 
thƌeat to TuƌkeǇ’s seĐuƌitǇ. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, the stƌuggle of “ǇƌiaŶ Kuƌdish gƌoups iŶ 
the north of Syria also led these politicians and bureaucrats to approach more 
suspiciously towards the rapprochement between Turkey and the KRG. It seems 
that similar suspicion about Turkey exists in the north of Iraq as well. Even though 
two party coalitions of the KDP and PUK governs the KRG, the influence of other 
political parties or movements in domestic politics should not be ignored. For 
instance, Goran, which was founded in 2009 as an opposition to the ruling of two-
party coalition in the KRG, is receiving support gradually. There are also Kurdish 
Islamist parties. While Turkey has established good relations with the KDP, it has 
approached discreetly to the Kurdish opposition parties. Therefore, it is argued 
that the iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG is ŵaiŶlǇ depeŶdeŶt oŶ 
the relations with Turkey and the KDP.61 Although the opposition parties are 
currently immature to shape foreign policy behavior of the KRG, it does not mean 
that they will never come to that level. Therefore, the rising of power of Iraqi 
Kurdish opposition political movements could reverse the warming relations with 
Turkey to the distant relations.  
Thirdly, the possibility of disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq, even including territories of Turkey, 
Syria and Iran, is still alive. Not more than five years ago, Massoud Barzani, 
President of the KRG, clearly expressed that they aim to declare an independent 
Kurdish state at reasonable time.62 In Turkey as well the number of Kurdish people 
and officials, who have a dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state, 
covering Kurds from Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria, is significantly high. However, like 
                                                 
60 In the time of writing this chapter, the AKP government re-initiated a peace process directly 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg ǁith the jailed leadeƌ of PKK, Aďdullah ÖĐalaŶ. Although the paƌtiĐulaƌs of the ƌoad 
map are still remained uŶdisĐlosed, Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ EƌdoğaŶ stated that PKK ŵilitaŶts should laǇ doǁŶ 
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KaƌaǇılaŶ, oŶe of the seŶioƌ leadeƌs of PKK, aďout ǁelĐoŵiŶg to the ǁithdƌaǁiŶg ŵilitaŶts to the KaŶdil 
MouŶtiaŶs, it is Ŷoǁ iŶǀisiďle hoǁ the pƌeseŶĐe of PKK ǁill iŶflueŶĐe TuƌkeǇ’s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the KRG iŶ 
the near future.   In other words, the continuation of the PKK presence in the north of Iraq will always 
have a potential to create conflictual relations with both Turkey and Iraqi central government and 
Turkey and the KRG, as happened in the past.  
61 Authoƌ’s iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁith aŶ IƌaƋi Turkmen politician, who wished to remain anonymous, on 26 
February 2013.   
62 Fikƌet BİLA, KuzeǇ Iƌak͛taki Çelişki, MilliǇet, Ϯϴ Şuďat ϮϬϬϳ. 
 
 
Özüŵ “eziŶ UzuŶ: National Role in Turkish Foreign Policy: Relations with Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq 
 
244 
Iraqi Kurdish officials, they are waiting for a reasonable time to actualize their 
dream. Therefore, it can said that since Turkey perceives the unity of Iraq as a 
requirement for both its own and regional security and stability, it is most likely 
that Turkey would use its both soft and hard power in any attempt of Iraqi Kurds 
to detach from central government. In this framework, it would be hard to talk 
about the sustainability of rapprochement process.  
Last but not least, Turkey and the KRG needs more time for confidence 
building, especially after long-term unstable relations. In conclusion, the 
rapprochement process would lose its momentum because it is still fragile due to 
the remaining of unresolved issues related with the security concerns of Turkey 
and mutual low confidence level. Furthermore, it is also possible to predict that 
regional developments, notably in Syria, could aggravate the conflictual issues in 
bilateral relations, triggering contradictory interests of both sides.  
 
